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I hope that I shall not be asked by the House to give
any definite account of such measures as we are able  to
take.  If I were to set them high, I might raise  false
hopes;  if I set them low, I might cause undue
despondency and alarm;  if I stated exactly what they
were, that would be exactly what the enemy would like
to know (Sir Winston Churchill 1940, p. 309).
Introduction
"Trade is war."  So bluntly stated an Australian agricultural
economist after returning from a stint at OECD in Paris  (Young).
Commercial policy has always been a form of strategic weapon.  Thomas
Jefferson, discussing relations with the Indian tribes in 1808, remarked
that "Commerce is  the great engine by which we are to coerce them, and not
war."  A primary difference between the pre- and post-nuclear age  is  the
reduced appeal of force as a means of achieving economic advantage.
Because modern tactical weapons make armed engagements riskier and more
expensive, Jefferson's dictum has new appeal:  the imperial ambitions of
nations  are pursued through economic trade policy.  What could be
accomplished in the 1930s and 40s by lethal force is  now pursued through
economic expansionism.
Trade strategy is  thus defined, like warfare, primarily by national
interest, and involves threat, counter-threat, subterfuge and retaliation.While the rhetoric of trade may lay claim to higher principles, such as
"free trade,"  "self-sufficiency,"  or  "fair trade,"  thinking of these
principles as calls to battle, rather than as real  objectives, gives a more
accurate impression of trade diplomacy.  This paper will adopt such a
perspective  (see also Runge, 1988).
Churchill's difficulty in making full and accurate statements about
strategic interests  to the House of Commons carries over  into the problems
of U.S. negotiators'  relations with Congress.  If announced public aims  are
set  too high for  the Uruguay Round, or too  low, false hopes or  fears may be
fostered in Congress and with the affected public.  Yet being totally
forthcoming would show one's hand before  it can be played.  This  is what
necessarily makes trade strategy even within the committees of Congress  so
much an insider's game.  It is  also what leads many affected interests to
fear that they will be traded away as pawns.
From the negotiators'  perspective, we can think of the final year of
the Uruguay Round as a war waged on three fronts.  The first  is  in Geneva,
where the multilateral trade negotiations  (MTN)  will be played out,
supposedly in December, 1990.  This multilateral front,  and support  for the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT) as a mechanism for  trade
reform, is  the most visible of the three.
The second front  involves  the bilateral relationships that exist with
individual countries, played out in national capitals.  These bilateral
relationships include the on-going tensions between Washington and
Brussels,  as well as  individual discussions with the European Community
(EC)  and its  member states, especially in London, Bonn and Paris.  They
also include Washington-Tokyo relations, and to  a lesser degree,  those with
2Cairns Group members such as Canada, Australia, Brazil and Argentina.
Because these bilateral relations are of longer and more permanent duration
than those in GATT  (where the Uruguay Round is  the eighth since World
War II)  they are often more informative and influential.  It  is often a
chain of bilateral deals which forms the basis for a multilateral one  in
GATT.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, is  the relationship with
Congress and affected interest groups.  Along this home  front is  to  be
found the rear guard of trade negotiation and the political supply lines
which give negotiating authority to  the GATT negotiators themselves.  Two
aspects of this support from home are vital to  the Uruguay Round process.
First, any multilateral agreement struck under GATT must, by law, be
ratified in Congress.  Those provisions dealing with agriculture will  thus
fall in part to the  subcommittees and committees  on agriculture whose
interests are most directly affected by various commodity groups.  Second,
the timing of the Uruguay Round will be interrelated with Congressional
decisions over  the 1990 farm bill, making the domestic politics of
agriculture impossible to  disentangle from trade strategy.  This paper will
be organized around a discussion of each front  in turn:  (1) the
multilateral negotiations in Geneva;  (2) bilateral negotiations;  and  (3)
the home front negotiations with Congress and affected interest groups.
Geneva:  Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The MTN process  in Geneva has wound through nearly three years  of
discussions as part of the 1986-90 Uruguay Round of the GATT  (for a review
see Barkema, et al.).  In December, 1988,  a "mid-term review" meeting  in
Montreal ended in discord, when the U.S. and EC failed  to bridge their
3fundamental differences over agriculture.  Additional problems in three of
the fifteen other negotiating areas:  textiles, intellectual property, and
safeguards, also prevented a package of framework agreements designed to
lay the groundwork for the final two years of the Uruguay Round.  However,
the midterm review was retrieved in April, 1989, when Geneva negotiations
resulted in framework agreements  in the problem areas.  In agriculture, the
U.S./EC differences were papered over with language  that called for
"substantial progressive reductions  in agricultural support and protection
. . . resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions
in world agricultural markets."  On the U.S. side, which had unsuccessfully
called for  "elimination"  of all trade distorting subsidies  in Montreal, the
Geneva language was  interpreted as a lot of reform in a hurry.  On the EC
side,  it was interpreted as modest reforms over an extended period.  The
long term goal of the Uruguay Round was reaffirmed as  "a fair and market-
oriented agricultural trading system."
Despite  these negotiating nostrums there were several important
departures in the April framework agreement worthy of note  (Gifford).
Areas  that had escaped scrutiny since 1947,  through seven previous  GATT
rounds, were targeted for reform, including the EC's variable levies and
other countries' voluntary export restraints.  In addition, country-
specific policies previously exempted from GATT rules and given special
treatment when various countries joined GATT were put on the  table  for
negotiation.  These policies include the majority of Swiss agricultural
subsidies,  Canadian wheat import permits,  and the U.S.  "Section 22"  import
quotas.  The midterm review also explicitly identified domestic measures
as a source of trade distortion, and hence in need of reform, and
4developed a detailed work program with milestones, including a first set of
(unspecified) long-term commitments to occur in 1991.
In the short term, the package agreed to in Geneva capped the level of
domestic and export support and protection at "current" levels, consistent
with existing legislation and GATT rules.  This does not imply that old
legislation cannot be changed and current programs replaced, unilaterally
or in coordination with other countries.  How countries will roll back or
eliminate existing trade or output distortions in 1990 and after was left
vague.  Overall, the midterm review package provided evidence of progress
in the Uruguay Round, but it  is  far from clear that the good intentions  it
expressed will be realized in a final 1990 package.
Immediately following the April accord, relatively little was done  for
several months, as negotiators allowed themselves relief over the fact  that
a midterm agreement had been reached at all.  In the July 10 meeting of the
Negotiating Group on Agriculture, however, the U.S. put forward a major
part of what is  emerging as its  final package of proposals  (GATT
Secretariat).  This  is  the so-called "tariffication"  concept, hailed by The
Economist as "the most promising way yet suggested to break out of GATT's
agricultural thicket."  In brief, tariffication means converting all non-
tariff import barriers to tariffs, which can then be "bound" and negotiated
downward over time.  Bound (or fixed) tariffs are  the preferred method of
import protection under GATT law.  The U.S. proposal suggested that the
difference between domestic and world prices be used as  the basic measure
of tariff equivalence.  For example, a quota increases domestic prices by
reducing the amount of supply available to consumers at the world price.
The difference between the world price and the higher domestic price is
5equivalent to a tariff of that amount.  If the domestic price for  the
product in question during the reference period is  100, and the world price
is  50,  the tariff equivalent would be 100 percent - [(100-50)/]  x 100.
The tariffication proposal sounds reasonable in the abstract, but is
sure to encounter resistance  from those sectors most reliant on quotas and
other nontariff protection for their livelihood.  In the U.S.,  this
includes those protected by dairy, sugar, tobacco and peanut import quotas.
There are also a variety of technical problems in calculating tariff
equivalents, including the choice of reference prices and base period.  The
U.S. paper also presages that "as  tariffication proceeds, some countries
may be tempted to impose new import restrictions in the form of product
standards, such as  sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions."
Tariffication may be thought of as the import protection side of the
U.S. proposal.  In addition to this there will be provisions  for eventual
removal of export subsidies and output distorting domestic policies.  At
the moment,  the U.S. Trade Representative's  Office (USTR)  and U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) are preparing a larger U.S. proposal to
GATT for submission in October or November, of which tariffication is  one
part.  While Carla Hills and Clayton Yeutter will lead the negotiations at
the highest level, the operating U.S. team will be led by Richard Crowder
of USDA and Ambassador Jules Katz of USTR, and represented in Geneva by
Ambassador Rufus Yerxe  (formerly Representative Dan Rostenkowski's chief
trade aide).  At the staff level will be Joe O'Mara at USDA and Suzanne
Early at USTR, with Deputy Chief of Mission Andrew Stoler in Geneva.  The
new proposal will include explicit treatment of export subsidies,  internal
subsidies,  sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and GATT rules  and
disciplines.
6It may be useful to summarize in graphical form the conception
underlying the evolving U.S. proposal  (see Runge and Taff).  In general,
trade-distorting measures may be thought of in terms of their effect on
(a) exports,  (b) imports and (c) output.  Tariff equivalents describe
distortions on the  import side, and subsidies on the export side.  Output
distortions resulting from internal policies are derived with respect to
their effect on production in domestic markets.  In each case, policies  may
either promote or retard exports, imports, or output.
With respect  to exports,  a policy has a distorting trade effect if
either buyers or sellers  in the domestic market face different conditions
from those who participate in the cross-border market.  Such a definition
encompasses not only policies  that affect the difference between export and
domestic prices, such as export taxes and subsidies, but also non-price
protective barriers such as voluntary export restraints.  As shown in
Figure  1, such policies may distort  trade either by artificially promoting
exports  (as in the  case of the Export Enhancement Program) or by
artificially retarding them  (as  in the case of Argentine export taxes or
voluntary export restraints).  Over the remainder of the Uruguay Round,  the
attempt will be to  define and to set GATT-negotiated limits,  for each
country, on those policies that are definitely slated for elimination,
preferably as soon as possible ("Red Light" policies);  those that may
remain in place  in the short-run, but are to be modified and reformed
during a transition phase ("Yellow Light" policies);  and those that  are
sufficiently non-distorting to remain in place indefinitely ("Green Light"
policies).
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10Similarly with respect to imports,  a policy has a distorting trade
effect if either buyers or sellers in the domestic market face different
conditions from those who participate in the cross-border market.  As  shown
in Figure  2, policies that retard imports,  such as quotas, explicit
tariffs, or health, safety and other sanitary or phytosanitary
restrictions, are one side of such distortions.  On the other side  (less
frequently mentioned) are policies that artificially promote imports.  An
example might be environmental regulations on fruit and vegetable
production which prohibit the use of certain cost-saving chemicals  in  the
U.S.,  leading to  incentives  to  import foreign fruit and vegetables which
employ such practices.  Because  it  is quickly realized by domestic growers
that such regulations have this effect, calls  for import protection through
health and safety standards applied equally  to foreign produce are quickly
heard, converting the regulations  from import-promoting to  import-retarding
policies  (see Runge, 1990).  In principle, either type  of distortion can be
expressed as  a tariff equivalent, with import promoting policies defined as
a negative tariff.  Once again, the  issue  is which policies are determined
to be definitely out-of-bounds  ("Red Light"),  which are undesirable  and to
be phased out over time  ("Yellow Light")  and which are acceptable ("Green
Light").
Finally are  those policies that have an effect on domestic production.
As shown in Figure 3, such policies may be negative, such as U.S.  and
European set-aside programs that pay farmers not to produce;  or they may
be positive, such as price supports  tied to  specific crop yields and acres
of production.  The goal of U.S.  domestic agricultural policy in the  Bush
administration is  generally to eliminate policies that are most distortive
11of production decisions  ("Red Light" policies),  including large set-asides
and high price supports, and to  phase out ("Yellow Light" policies)  those
that have tended to  distort production over  time, such as crop-specific
acreage bases.  What remains  ("Green Light" policies) will be programs  in
which farmers are relatively free to  plant whatever crops are most in
market demand, with support paid not to specific crops, but on the basis of
some type of income criteria.
Overall, progress in the present GATT negotiations can be defined as
an agreement to eliminate a specific set of "Red Light" policies  in each
realm  (exports, imports, and output) with a well-defined timetable, and to
designate a set of "Yellow Light" policies for discussion in subsequent
years.  It seems inevitable  (to  this  author) that successful negotiations
will ultimately involve agreements  to end specific policies, and that such
political decisions cannot be finessed by an agreement simply to  achieve an
aggregate level of support or  level of tariff or  subsidy.  This  is  the
route sometimes  suggested by advocates of a single aggregate measure, such
as the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE).  As Hertel  (1989a, b) has
recently shown, a given reduction in the aggregate  level of support  can be
achieved with a myriad of different options, many of which have extremely
different effects  on exports, imports and output.  His analysis  shows  that
aggregate measures, because they abstract from  this complexity,
"underidentify"  the problem, and thus  do not provide sufficient discipline
to achieve longlasting reform.
Before turning to the bilateral and home fronts,  let me touch on the
relationship between agriculture and several other key areas  of  the Uruguay
Round negotiations.  While publicly stating that all fifteen areas are
12crucial, the tactical  importance attached to some is more  important than
others.  This is sufficiently well-known to  the negotiators  themselves  that
it does seem seditious to state  them (the "enemy",  in other words,  already
knows which battles will be key).  Agriculture,  throughout the Uruguay
Round, has been crucial, and remains so.  A minimum of results must be
achieved in agriculture for the U.S.  trade strategy to  be called a success.
Some type of framework agreement in Services is also vital,  largely due to
the substantial interests of the American financial community.  The
remaining three areas of vital importance are Trade-Related Investment
Measures  (TRIMS); Trade in Intellectual Property  (TRIPS); and the
negotiations on Subsidies.  It is  beyond the scope of this paper  to  discuss
these areas,  each of which would require treatments of similar length.
The Bilateral Front
Despite the emphasis  on multilateral negotiations, a large share of
negotiating gets done  in capitals.  Several examples are  illustrative of
the importance of  this bilateral front.  In agriculture, an important issue
with Europe has been the continuing dispute over beef hormones.  On January
1, 1989,  the European Community announced a  ban on all beef imports  from
the United States containing hormones used to help  increase cattle growth.
Citing health risks, the  EC action touched off a cycle of retaliation  that
has affected the world trading system (Bredahl).  This  apparently  isolated
example of health regulations acting as trade barriers is part of an
emerging pattern of environmental and health issues with major consequences
for world trade.  The  larger significance of the hormones dispute relates
to  the growing role of non-tariff import barriers, especially justified on
health, safety and environmental grounds.  As noted above,  the  temptation
13to use such sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions  is increasing, for a
variety of reasons.
In the high income countries of Europe and North America, health,
safety and environmental regulations are especially attractive candidates
for use as non-tariff barriers.  They are part of a larger problem:
environmental and health risks are  increasingly traded among nations along
with goods  and services.  While increasing emphasis is given to  the  growing
role of services trade, comparatively little has been directed to  risks
which are the opposite of services:  environmental and health disservices
traded across national borders.  This  problem arises directly  from the
transfer of technology, and will increasingly affect international
investment flows,  product liability, trade and development, and the
relative competitiveness of U.S. business  (Runge,  1990).
The emergence of a two-tiered international structure of environmental
regulation results from increasingly stringent rules  and regulations  and a
rising concern with environmental quality and human health among wealthy
nations.  In most developing countries, however, rapid economic growth
remains  the primary  focus of concern.  This creates  incentives  to export
restricted  industrial materials--or whole production processes--from North
to South.  A kind of "environmental arbitrage"  results,  in which profits
are gained by exploiting the differential in regulations.  In  the United
States,  for example,  the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,  and Rodenticide
Act  (FIFRA),  the Safe Drinking Wate  Act  (SDWA) and the  1990 Farm Bill  are
all  likely to be amended in ways that effectively constrain chemical and
land use choices.  These are but several examples which may lead
multinational firms  to expand in markets where regulatory oversight is  less
constraining.
14This environmental arbitrage  results from conscious policy choices
that reveal differences  in the value attached to environmental quality by
rich and poor countries.  As these paths of institutional  innovation
increasingly diverge, so will the differential impact of environmental
constraints on businesses  in Europe, North America and, say, Argentina and
Brazil.  The competitiveness implications of these trends are not lost on
developed country firms.  They have been quick to see  the trade relevance
of environmental and health standards  in limiting access both to  developing
country competition and other developed countries.  Growing consumer
concerns with health and the  environment create a natural  (and much
larger) constituency for nontariff barriers to trade.  It  is  doubtful,  for
example,  that beef-offal merchants in the European Community could have
blocked competitive U.S.  imports solely in the name of  superior French or
German beef kidneys.  But the hormones question created a large, vocal, and
committed constituency for denying U.S. access to  this  market.  These
distortions threaten more liberal international trade  in ways that are
damaging to both developed and developing country interests, yet are not
widely appreciated.
The beef hormones dispute, while a relatively minor bilateral dispute
in terms of total trade value  ($100 million annually),  thus  illustrates
the importance of bilateral trade diplomacy in conditioning multilateral
trade issues.  While attempts are made to keep them separate,  the
bilateral and multilateral fronts of the  trade war nonetheless  relate to
one another, if for no other reason than because they both draw down on the
fighting strength of U.S. negotiators.
15A second current example concerns  the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) concluded in 1988.  This bilateral accord, heralded as a triumph for
trade liberalization,  nonetheless raises questions  in many capitals  over
the possible evolution of a North American trading bloc, which might,
together with a unified Europe after 1992,  end up destablizing world
trade.  In his 40th Anniversary speech  to the GATT contracting parties in
Geneva, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker warned of just such an
eventuality.  Because Canada is  a member of the Cairns  group,  the
Ottawa/Washington cable traffic  inevitably causes FTA issues  to be checked
against GATT strategy to  coordinate the  two fronts.  In agriculture, much
of the FTA language  refers specifically  to  the need for such coordination.
A third bilateral relationship of key importance is with Tokyo.  The
bilateral agreement struck between the U.S. and Japan on access  to Japanese
markets  for beef in mid-1988,  for example, provided a recipe for the  1989
U.S. tariffication proposal to  GATT.  The deal with Tokyo first determined
that quotas and other non-tariff barriers to  trade were equivalent to  a
tariff of 96 percent.  It was then agreed to phase out  the quotas and other
non-tariff measures and to replace them with a tariff of 70  percent in
1991.  Finally, tariff cuts to 60 percent in 1992 and 50 percent in  1993
were scheduled, with further cuts  to be negotiated as part of  the
multilateral process:
These three examples of bilateral relations  -- with the  EC, Canada,
and Japan -- illustrate the significance of the second front of trade
warfare.  Trade policy analysts who focus only on the multilateral  front,
and neglect the bilateral role,  fail to see  that both are crucial to
victory.  There is yet a third front, however, of greater importance even
16than these  two, because it involves the political supply lines of trade
negotiation.
The Home Front:  Relations with Congress and Interest Groups
The capacity successfully to resolve trade negotiations as  complex and
overriding as the GATT talks depends  crucially on effective  liaison with
Congress  and affected interest groups.  In agriculture, there will clearly
be winners and losers  from the Uruguay Round, although in my view the
winners will substantially outnumber the losers.  Win or lose, no one who
farms or is affected by farming wants to  feel that a democratically elected
government can make major changes  in policy without consulting  those most
seriously affected by these changes.  Failing to  consult with such groups
is  political folly in any event, as administration after administration has
learned.  When Woodrow Wilson went off to  Europe to create a League of
Nations designed to end all wars, he failed to protect  these political
supply lines, and was dumfounded when Congress failed to  ratify  the  treaty.
His actions contributed to  an isolationist response that helped to bring on
World War II.
There are  two elements of successful trade strategy on the home front,
in my view.  The first is  to involve directly the members of Congress whose
committees bear responsibility  for trade matters,  so that they develop a
feel for what negotiators cryptically refer to  as  the  "modalities"  of this
process.  Earlier this year, House Agriculture Committee Chairman "Kika" de
la Garza left for Geneva in a highly agitated state, worried that "the  farm
bill was being written in Switzerland."  The  trip turned out well, and
helped to  allay his  fears.  Other key members of Congress,  including
Senator Patrick Leahy,  Chairman of the Senate Agriculture  and Forestry
17Committee;  Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of House Ways and Means;  and Sam
Gibbons,  chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of Ways and Means, have all
been briefed in Geneva on the process.
Beyond the members of Congress, and perhaps even more  important, stand
the interest groups that exert enormous  influence over Congressional
decision-making  (Rapp).  In agriculture, these include the commodity
groups and general farm organizations, as well as  the agribusiness sector.
At USTR, an elaborate network of policy advisory councils, composed of
thousands of representatives  of U.S. business, labor, and farmers, meets
regularly with negotiators to  provide input into the process.  The highest
level of this pyramid of advisory committees  is  the President's Advisory
Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN), a general advisory board on which
agriculture is prominently represented.  Members have included the head of
the American Farm Bureau and the California almond growers, among others.
Despite these formal advisory groups, much more must be done  outside
of Washington to  inform (and to be informed) by farm interest groups as  the
final year of the Uruguay Round commences.  This  is  especially significant
in light of the simultaneity of the Farm Bill  and GATT processes
(Drabenscott, et al.).  In my view there are two tactical concerns  that
will dominate the home front.  The  first is  the likely development of a
large "war chest" of threatened export subsidies, perhaps  in the form of
"marketing loans across board,"  if the GATT talks fail.  This  is what
nuclear strategists refer to  as a "credible threat,"  one  form of which is
MAD, for  "mutually assured destruction".  The problem, of course,  is  that
to work, the threat must be credible; but to be credible, it must be
disastrous for all concerned.  Despite these risks,  I expect to see  some
such threat emerge from the  1990 farm bill process.
18The second tactical  issue on the home front concerns what  I would call
weak points in the domestic line.  These weak points are defined precisely
around commodities heavily protected from foreign competition by U.S.  law,
and thus standing to  lose the most from trade liberalization.
Uncoincidentally,  these are  the commodities that have the most highly
developed lobbying skills  in Congress.  Examples include sugar,  some parts
of the dairy industry (especially outside  the Midwest, in California and
Florida),  and other, smaller commodities like peanuts.  Despite  the  fact
that the beneficiaries  of these programs are few (10,000 sugar producers
receive $1.5  billion annually, according to one recent estimate),  they
happen to be located in places like Kika de la Garza's district  in Texas,
and in the Red River Valley of Minnesota (Mehra).
Weak points in a line, in my view, should not be exposed to  undue
fire, or  the entire tide of battle may be turned.  I thus  am inclined to
suggest an aggressive liberalization thrust at our strongest points  (feed
grains, oilseeds),  saving weaker commodities for subsequent treatment.
While some argue that such an approach is  "inconsistent,"  it  is  far  from
clear that consistency is  the path to reform, anymore  than an effective
assault requires uniform pressure along all points  in the  line.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have described three fronts of the battle  for trade
liberalization:  the multilateral,  bilateral and home fronts.  Each is
vital  to  the process  of trade liberalization,  and each will require  its  own
approaches.  Yet all must be planned and executed in a coordinated fashion.
Little wonder that trade liberalization comes slowly.  But a war is not won
in a day.
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